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JUDGING SCIENCE: AN ESSAY ON THE 
UNSCIENTIFIC BASIS OF BELIEFS ABOUT 
THE IMPACT OF LEGAL RULES ON 
SCIENCE AND THE NEED FOR BETTER 
DATA ABOUT LAW 
 
Gillian K. Hadfield* 
INTRODUCTION 
There’s a simple maxim: practice what you preach. Most of us 
have difficulty taking advice from—even worse submitting to the 
authority of—those who fail to abide by this maxim. This may 
explain, at least in part, the tensions between those in the scientific 
community and those in law. Law sits in judgment of science and 
scientific method in many settings, including adjudicating 
scientific evidence about hazard rates or toxicity, regulating 
standards of care in medicine, and assessing the qualifications of 
scientific expert witnesses and their compliance with scientific 
method. Ironically, however, those who propound legal 
conclusions about science could rarely meet the standards imposed 
on science. The legal system—judges, legal scholars, lawyers and 
legal policymakers—has to date shown very little interest in 
systematic, scientific assessment of how the legal system itself 
operates. Our data are poor and our models are few.1 Small 
                                                          
 *Professor of Law, University of Southern California Gould School of Law. 
My thanks to Steven Lauridsen for excellent research assistance. 
1 See N. William Hines, Empirical Scholarship: What Should We Study and 
How Should We Study It?, ASSOC. AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS PRESIDENT AND 
THE UNIVERSITY OF IOWA, http://www.aals.org/am2006/theme.html (describing 
the theme for the upcoming 2006 annual meeting). See also Elizabeth Warren, 
The Market for Data: The Changing Role of Social Sciences in Shaping the Law, 
2002 WIS. L. REV. 1, 2 n.2 (2002) (citing several works over the last decade 
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wonder, perhaps, that serious scientists chafe under the scientific 
requirements imposed on them by lawyers. 
Nonetheless, the questions we have about the impact of the 
legal system—not the substance of legal rules per se, but the 
practices and policies of how legal procedures are implemented 
(with ultimate effects on substantive legal rules) by judges, courts, 
and legal service providers—on the practice and application of 
science are myriad. They include: 
 
• Is the cost of science-based litigation discouraging important 
litigation? 
• Is Daubert2 leading to better legal decisions involving 
scientific evidence? 
• Is the deterrence effect of (tort) law being diminished by 
Daubert? 
• Is the deterrence effect of (tort) law being diminished by a 
policy in favor of settlement? 
• Are “secret settlements” and sealed case files leading to 
increased risks of injury/inadequate deterrence? 
• Is the increasing emphasis on costly scientific expertise 
creating an asymmetry between corporate and individual 
litigants? 
• Are legal rules regarding the admissibility and sufficiency of 
evidence discouraging scientific research by corporations? 
• Are corporate defendants succeeding in shifting legal 
                                                          
calling for more empirical legal research). Compare Dennis M. Patterson, The 
Limits of Empiricism: What Facts Tell Us, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2738, 2738 (2000) 
(“The conventional legal academic wisdom about empiricism is that empirical 
information is by-and-large a good thing, that we need more of it, and that 
empirical analysis is preferable to many scholarly alternatives now on offer in 
law review literature.”), with William M. Landes, The Empirical Side of Law 
and Economics, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 167, 180 (2003) (“[E]mpirical work does not 
occupy an exalted place at law schools. It would only be a modest exaggeration 
to say that most law professors regard empirical work as a form of drudgery not 
worthy of first-class minds. In the legal academic pecking order, empirical 
research does not rank as high as theory. This translates into a downward shift in 
the demand for empirical relative to theoretical scholarship in law economics.”). 
2 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
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standards on summary judgment and motions to dismiss to 
thus keep individual plaintiffs away from juries? 
 
These are important questions about the design features of our 
legal system. Many attributes can to some extent be manipulated 
by judges, court administrators, and lawyers, in order to improve 
the quality of outcomes produced by the legal system. These 
attributes include: 
 
• Standards and procedures for the admissibility of expert 
evidence 
• Rules of evidence 
• Standards for summary judgment and motions to dismiss 
• The use and interpretation of risk assessments 
• The use of neutral or partisan experts 
• The participation of courts in sealing and enforcing secret 
settlements 
• The use of protective orders to limit access to information 
gleaned through discovery 
• The rules for the distribution of legal costs 
• The rules governing class actions, including jurisdiction, 
attorneys fees, and class certification 
 
The pros and cons of different attributes (e.g., whether the 
standard for admitting expert evidence should be higher or lower, 
or whether courts should agree to keep data developed in discovery 
under seal) are heavily debated in law. Often the arguments are 
empirically-based and predictive, such as: raising the standard for 
admitting expert evidence will reduce the likelihood of “Junk 
science” in the courtroom,3 and secret settlements are essential to 
promote the production of data in discovery.4 And yet, the legal 
profession as a whole pays relatively little attention to the careful 
                                                          
3 See, e.g., PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO’S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE 
COURTROOM (1991). 
4 See, e.g., Laurie Kratky Dore, Secrecy by Consent: The Use and Limits of 
Confidentiality in the Pursuit of Settlement, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 283 
(1999). 
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evaluation of these empirical claims. Law studies the impact of 
itself on the outcomes it intends to produce sporadically or not at 
all. There is no structural equivalent to the “public health” or 
epidemiology frameworks we find in medicine, according to which 
some members of the medical profession devote their efforts to 
evaluating health care as a whole and tracking the relationship 
between systems of prevention, diagnosis, and treatment on the 
one hand and the health and wellness outcomes we care about on 
the other. Law, as a system of courts, government agencies, 
lawyers, and legal scholars, has no institutional arm devoted to 
careful study of the question of how well the legal system performs 
in achieving its goals. In the area of science, law plays a large 
regulatory role: influencing the investments in and standards for 
clinical trials for pharmaceuticals, or the development of safety 
mechanisms in cars, or the scientific requirements that must be met 
to avoid and prevent infringement on patented procedures, 
equipment, or materials. In spite of this role the question of how 
well the legal system regulates science is not systematically 
addressed in a scientific manner by assessing data, testing 
hypotheses, and evaluating alternatives. 
In Part I of this essay, I discuss the problems of data collection 
in the legal system. In Part II, I examine the impact of these data 
problems on our knowledge about a particular fact about the legal 
system, namely the frequency with which matters actually go to 
trial. I report in this Part results from a study I have done of the 
reliability of the available data about the “vanishing trial” that 
demonstrates the difficulty we face in understanding the 
determinants of even this basic attribute of our legal system. 
Finally, I offer some conclusions. 
I. PROBLEMS IN DATA COLLECTION 
The problem begins at the very first step in any evidence-based 
system of knowledge: the collection of data. There are few legal 
institutions devoted to the collection of data about the legal system, 
and essentially none are charged with collecting data for the 
purposes of evaluating the impact of legal rules and practices on 
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outcomes. As I will discuss in detail below, the data about the legal 
system are frequently unreliable and easily misinterpreted. Often 
data are collected sporadically, disrupting our ability to judge over 
time how variables are changing. Coding practices shift over time, 
also making longitudinal comparisons difficult if not impossible. 
What information is collected about law, particularly through 
discovery in individual cases, is frequently very difficult to access. 
A large and highly variable percentage of case opinions remain 
unpublished, further skewing the analysis of even the small 
fraction that result in an opinion.5 
One of the most significant sources of inadequacy in our data 
about law rests in the norms and practices related to confidentiality 
in the legal system. Protective orders sealing document records are 
routine in litigation involving corporations.6 Final case outcomes 
in a large percentage of cases involve a private settlement that is 
itself sealed and that imposes non-disclosure requirements on those 
privy to its contents.7 Moreover, the centrality of confidentiality to 
the attorney-client relationship means that very little information 
about what lawyers do, what they charge, what issues they face, 
and what choices they make, ever becomes available for study. 
Advocacy is defined as the start and the end of the attorney-client 
relationship, again reflecting the absence of a “public health” 
perspective on the workings of the legal system. Medical 
professionals similarly face issues of confidentiality and loyalty to 
the well-being of their patients, but they also adopt a stance that is 
curious about and committed to the scientific assessment of how 
well prevention, diagnosis and treatment methods, in the 
aggregate, are working.8 Medicine, through professional practices 
of sharing case-related information with colleagues and 
researchers, and sometimes subject to legal regulation of 
                                                          
5 Mitu Gulati & C.M.A. McCauliff, On Not Making Law, 61 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 157, 202-03 (1998). 
6 See Dore, supra note 4, at 324-32. 
7 See id. at 384. 
8 See, e.g., Gregory E. Simon et al., Large Medical Databases, Population-
Based Research, and Patient Confidentiality, 157 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1731, 
1731 (2000). 
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disclosures, manages to maintain confidentiality for patients 
without losing the valuable data content of what their work with 
patients reveals. Not so with legal professionals. Data about cases 
are rarely shared with researchers, even in anonymous fashion. 
This all adds up to a stunning lack of information about how 
one of the most central institutions of our market democracy 
functions in fact, and leaves almost nowhere to turn for answers to 
the questions we have about how well the system operates to 
regulate the other central institutions such as medicine and the 
corporation. We know essentially nothing about how alternative 
dispute resolution systems work, because most often, once a case is 
diverted into private dispute resolution, almost no information 
emerges for public analysis.9 Similarly, there are limited public 
data available about the cost of legal services. The U.S. Census 
collects and reports annual data about total receipts in law firms,10 
allowing some measure of the “size” of the legal system; but these 
data do not include expenditures on legal services provided by 
employed lawyers: corporate in-house legal departments or 
government lawyers. There are separate data available on public 
expenditures on courts and government attorneys involved in the 
civil and criminal justice systems, provided by the Bureau of 
Justice Statistics, but it excludes government-employed legal 
departments that are not affiliated with the activities of the justice 
system, such as legal counsel providing governments with services 
related to government contracting or employment.11 The Bureau of 
                                                          
9 There are a few limited exceptions. The National Association of 
Securities Dealers publishes arbitration awards in securities disputes. See 
Securities Arbitration Commentor, http://www.sacarbitration.com (last visited 
Oct. 27, 2005). AAA employment arbitration awards have been available since 
1999. See American Arbitration Association, http://www.adr.org/AAAawards/ 
(last visited Oct. 27, 2005). 
10 2002 COUNTY BUSINESS PATTERNS AND 2002 ECONOMIC CENSUS, 
NUMBER OF FIRMS, NUMBER OF ESTABLISHMENTS, EMPLOYMENT, ANNUAL 
PAYROLL, AND RECEIPTS BY RECEIPT SIZE OF THE ENTERPRISE FOR THE UNITED 
STATES, ALL INDUSTRIES 2002, http://www.census.gov/csd/susb/ usalli_r02.xls. 
11 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN, JUSTICE EXPENDITURES AND 
EMPLOYMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, 2001 (May 2004), available at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/jeeus01.pdf. 
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Labor Statistics collects information about wages and hours in law 
firms, but only for non-supervisory employees, a category that 
excludes most lawyers.12 
Privately, consulting firms, most notably Altman-Weil, 
conduct voluntary surveys of lawyers and law firms, collecting a 
wide variety of information—such as hourly rates, billable hours, 
total receipts, expenditures on paralegals—for purposes of selling 
the data, and business advice, to law firms and lawyers.13 The 
sample, beginning in 1985, is one of the only longitudinal and 
national data sets on billing rates of which I am aware, and its 
value as a dataset has yet to be exploited by researchers. However, 
this value is limited by two factors: first, it is self-selected and 
therefore concentrated on Altman-Weil clients and hence not 
necessarily representative; and second, it is available to the public 
only in aggregate descriptive tables, rather than on the firm-by-
firm or lawyer-by-lawyer basis necessary to perform statistical 
tests of correlation and causation. Cost data, which would be 
especially relevant to many of the questions we have about the 
courts and science, including data about experts and other 
expenditures on discovery and trial preparation, are currently non-
existent in public form. 
It is important to emphasize that the problem is not that these 
data on legal costs are not collected and retained; it is that the 
collection and retention is done by private firms and rarely made 
public, even in anonymous fashion. Indeed, as pressures to rein in 
legal costs have burgeoned in recent years, purchasers of legal 
services have turned to data collection and analysis for insights and 
mechanisms for cost control.14 Auditors are available to analyze 
                                                          
12 BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, WAGES BY AREA 
AND OCCUPATION, http://www.bls.gov/bls/blswage.htm. 
13 ALTMAN WEIL, INC., SURVEY OF LAW FIRM ECONOMICS, 
http://www.altmanweil.com/products/ surveys/slfe.cfm. 
14 See Gillian K. Hadfield, The Price of Law: How the Market for Lawyers 
Distorts the Justice System, 98 MICH. L. REV. 953, 957-58 (2000). See, e.g., 
TECUM, Inc., Is Your Law Firm Saving or Costing You?, 
http://www.tecuminc.com (last visited Oct. 27, 2005) (providing consulting and 
analysis services for the “control of litigation costs”). 
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the accumulated legal bills received by their clients.15 On a large 
scale, the insurance industry has managed to significantly reduce 
its expenditures on legal fees and case settlements over the past 
two decades by mining the data it accumulates about claims, costs 
and payouts. The industry has thus been able to auction off blocks 
of business for fixed fees, a cost-internalization mechanism made 
possible by the systematic analysis, and sharing, of claim history 
and the identification of factors that can be used to predict the cost 
of litigating and settling claims.16 These data, however, are 
generally hoarded and not made publicly available. Insurance 
information is only sporadically released for study by government 
agencies that track such data. Incomplete and sporadic data such as 
this, while still valuable, often lacks continuity and comparability 
and the information needed to assess representativeness. More 
importantly, the data generally do not contain detailed information 
about the legal procedures and practices that played a role in 
determining the outcome. 
As one might expect, data about public courts and their 
activities are more easily available for research and analysis. 
Keeping track of procedures and rulings in court is a fundamental 
feature of case management and a primary task of court clerks who 
maintain docket sheets for each case. Recently, electronic access to 
court dockets has become available throughout the federal courts, 
using the Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER) 
system, which provides litigants and researchers with the ability to 
review the docket online and, in some cases, view case 
documents.17 Data from this source are an important new resource 
for studies of the legal system, albeit one that allows a researcher 
to go back in time only to the late 1990s. This data source, 
however, suffers from an important shortcoming. One of the key 
variables in case analysis is the nature of the suit—such as product 
                                                          
15 See, e.g, TECUM, Inc., supra note 14. See also ZURICH, LITIGATION 
MANAGEMENT, http://www.zurichna.com/zus/onlineservices.nsf/0/2d5debbbff 
deb1ad85256c6800664ff9?OpenDocument. 
16 See ZURICH, supra note 15. 
17 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, PACER Service Center, 
http://pacer.psc.uscourts.gov/. 
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liability, securities, civil rights—and many larger cases involve 
multiple areas of the law. Cases in PACER dockets, however, are 
coded for a single type, even when cases involve multiple causes 
of action. In addition, the nature of suit coding is based on 
whatever the plaintiff, her attorney or paralegal indicated as “the” 
cause of action on the cover sheet she filled in when she filed the 
case. The reliability of this categorization for research purposes is 
an open question. 
For longer term analysis, the most comprehensive database on 
the work of courts is collected by the Administrative Office of the 
U.S. Courts (AO) and compiled for analysis by the Federal Judicial 
Center. These data report on many aspects of bankruptcy, civil and 
criminal trials and appeals, and in various forms go back several 
decades. Data are on a case-by-base basis, giving the names of the 
first-named plaintiff and defendant, the nature of suit, the court in 
which the case was heard, the dates of filing and termination, the 
procedural progress of the case at the time of termination, the 
means of termination, whether the action is filed as a class action, 
the amounts demanded and awarded, and so on. Much of the data 
are available in reported aggregated form from the AO in a set of 
annual tables going back as early as the 1960s. Of even greater 
value to researchers, the data are available electronically on a case-
by-case basis going back to 1970 and can be downloaded from a 
publicly available website.18 These data, however, cover only some 
2% of all litigation as the vast majority of litigation takes place in 
state court and does not involve the federal system. 
Data on state courts are decidedly less comprehensive. 
Although the National Center for State Courts has a number of 
programs devoted to collecting data from all state courts, the sheer 
number of state systems and the autonomy of these systems in 
terms of recordkeeping mean that comparable data are difficult to 
assemble. Caseload, meaning total filing, data are available for all 
courts.19 The greatest effort to collect more detailed data, the Civil 
                                                          
18 ICPSR: INTER-UNIVERSITY CONSORTIUM FOR POLITICAL AND SOCIAL 
RESEARCH, http://www.icpsr.org. 
19 NCSC: NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, COURT STATISTICS 
PROJECT, http://www.ncsconline.org/D_Research/csp/CSP_Main_Page.html. 
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Justice Survey of State Courts, involves a sample of tort, property 
and contract cases in 45 jurisdictions representing the 75 most 
populous counties in the country. Data on the outcomes including 
who prevailed, in what amount and the duration of the litigation, in 
trials have been collected for 1992 (jury trials only), 1996 and 
2001.20 Although these data include some very helpful information 
not collected in the federal database—particularly the nature of the 
plaintiff and defendant whether individual, government or 
business—data about non-trial outcomes were only collected in 
1992. The subsequent restriction to completed trials misses a large 
component of court and litigation activity of prime interest to 
researchers, namely the disposition of cases in non-trial methods 
such as settlement, summary judgments and court-ordered 
dismissals. 
Other researcher-collected databases exist. Two of the most 
notable are the RAND data on civil jury trials in 15 jurisdictions 
from 1985-1994 and the RAND data on tort jury verdicts in San 
Francisco and Cook counties spanning a 40-year period.21 
However, by focusing only on completed jury trials, such datasets 
limit our look into the conduct of courts and the decisions courts, 
judges, lawyers and litigants make in processing a case. Moreover, 
datasets collected by individual researchers tend to be, given the 
tremendously labor-intensive process of reviewing case files, 
rather limited in scope—focusing only one type of case (i.e., class 
actions, asbestos cases), or a limited number of jurisdictions or a 
single time period. The more finely tuned the study is to a 
particular feature of the legal system—the use of Daubert, the cost 
of legal services, the invocation of the policy in favor of 
settlement—the more limited the scope of the dataset is likely to 
be. 
                                                          
20 The data for 1996 can be analyzed in a helpful online “query” system. 
Theodore Eisenberg & Kevin M. Clemont, CORNELL UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL, 
http://teddy.law.cornell.edu:8090/questata.htm. 
21 RAND INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, TRENDS IN CIVIL JURY VERDICTS: 
NEW DATA FROM 15 JURISDICTIONS, http://www.rand.org/publications/ 
RB/RB9025/RB9025.html; Seth A. Seabury et al., Forty Years of Civil Jury 
Verdicts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1 (2004). 
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The problems in obtaining the data necessary for systematic 
and statistically sound descriptions and predictions about how 
various aspects of the legal system impact the use and practice of 
science go beyond the fact that limited data are collected. 
Unfortunately, even the data that we have are sometimes 
unreliable, at least insofar as they can be easily misinterpreted by 
researchers. To demonstrate this point, I now turn to a more 
detailed discussion of the difficulties I have discovered in the most 
extensive and comprehensive database about litigation that we 
have, the federal civil trials termination data, and the problems 
these data present in reaching conclusions about a basic feature of 
our legal system, namely the question of whether cases today are 
more or less likely to end in a trial as opposed to a settlement or a 
non-trial adjudication, and if so, what might explain such a trend. 
II. A CASE IN POINT: THE VANISHING TRIAL 
It is clear to anyone involved in the legal system that many 
things have changed in the system in the past three decades. 
Caseloads have increased dramatically, significant efforts to 
promote settlement and alternative dispute resolution have become 
institutionalized, and litigation has become increasingly dominated 
by discovery and motion practice. There have also been 
substantial, not unrelated, changes in legal doctrine. In federal 
courts, for instance, the standards for surviving summary judgment 
have, by some accounts, been significantly tightened22 and the 
reach of the Federal Arbitration Act, which requires states to 
strictly enforce arbitration clauses even in standardized consumer 
and employment contracts, has been extended by the U.S. Supreme 
Court.23 In addition, legal practice has become increasingly 
specialized and high-priced, and the size of law firms has 
                                                          
22 See Arthur Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation 
Explosion,” “Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in 
Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 984, 1006, 1016 
(2003). 
23 See, e.g., Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995). 
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exploded.24 In the wake of these changes, a question has emerged: 
Is the trial disappearing from our legal system? It would seem that 
this should be a basic question with a straightforward answer. But 
the great difficulty in answering this question is a testament to the 
problems facing the availability and use of data about the legal 
system. 
A. The Trouble With Numbers 
The first place to look for the answer is the data published by 
the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, specifically the “C-4” 
tables in the Report of the Director that provide annual figures for 
the percentage of cases reaching trial. Marc Galanter recently 
observed from these tables that, whereas in 1962 a full 11.5% of all 
federal cases reached trial, in 2001, only 1.8% did.25 This appears 
to be a stunning drop and clearly evidence of the fact that trials are 
vanishing from federal courtrooms. It confirms for many their 
anecdotal experience: the judge who hears only one or two trials a 
year; the court administrator who looks out on dark courtrooms; 
the trial lawyer who no longer goes to trial. As a phenomenon, it 
triggers a host of questions about causation. Is the drop a result of 
the increasing cost of litigation, fueled by increasingly expensive 
and specialized lawyering, extensive discovery, and heavy use of 
high-cost experts? Is it evidence of tort reform in disguise and the 
erosion of the role of the jury in the American legal system? Is the 
disappearance of the trial a result of the success of the alternative 
dispute resolution movement and judicial hostility towards trial? Is 
the phenomenon related to an increasingly pro-defendant or pro-
corporate judiciary? Is it part and parcel of a clawing back of the 
rights created by the revolutions in civil rights and tort law that 
took place in the 1960’s and 70’s?26 Does the elimination of the 
                                                          
24 See JOHN P. HEINZ ET AL, URBAN LAWYERS: THE NEW SOCIAL 
STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 12, 37 (2005). 
25 Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and 
Related Matters in Federal and State Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 
459 (2004) (noting a 60% decline in the number of trials from 1962 to 2002). 
26 Judith Resnik, Constricting Remedies: The Rehnquist Judiciary, 
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trial reflect the “privatization” of litigation, with the resulting loss 
of public access to information and the public good of law 
developed through precedent? Does the diminished likelihood of 
trial imply a reduction in the deterrence effect of law? 
These are “scientific” questions about law: about the frequency 
of a phenomenon, its causes and possible cures. If these questions 
were asked about safety mechanisms in a piece of machinery or 
about the medical care someone received, the law would require 
that scientific testimony about frequency, causation and cure be 
adequately rooted in scientific method, meeting the standards for 
professional engineers or medicine or statisticians including valid 
inferences and reliable proof: 
[I]n order to qualify as “scientific knowledge,” an inference 
or assertion must be derived by the scientific method. 
Proposed testimony must be supported by appropriate 
validation – i.e., “good grounds,” based on what is 
known. . . . [A] key question to be answered in determining 
whether a theory or technique is scientific knowledge that 
will assist the trier of fact will be whether it can be (and has 
been) tested. . . . [I]n the case of a particular scientific 
technique, the court ordinarily should consider the known 
or potential rate of error.27 
Applying those same standards to our observations about the 
vanishing trial reveals just how little we know, in fact, about what 
is happening in even this most basic attribute of our legal system. 
Without those answers, it is difficult to know whether the 
vanishing trial is a good or a bad phenomenon. If trials are 
disappearing from the resolution of commercial contract disputes, 
that may be all for the good, if it reflects the rationalization of 
commercial disputes and a reduction in the cost of litigating. For 
these litigants, there may be little value to be gained from a third-
party public determination of their conflict. On the other hand, if 
trials are disappearing from the claims made by individual citizens 
against large organizations—under the civil rights or tort laws—
                                                          
Congress, and Federal Power, 78 IND. L.J. 223 (2003). 
27 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590, 593-94 (1993). 
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then the loss of the trial may be indicative of other democratic 
losses, both for the individuals involved and for the public. 
Certainly, we cannot begin to remedy any change we judge to be 
undesirable without knowing, in fact, what is happening and then, 
from that, why. 
Recently, I “unpacked” the available data about the frequency 
of trials in federal court and discovered that we have a long way to 
go before we can reliably say whether or not the likelihood of trials 
(and which trials) has fallen over the past several decades, and 
even further before we can reliably say what might be causing that 
fall. There are four fundamental difficulties in interpreting the 
basic statistics reported by the AO: first, the data relate to a 
different population of cases than the group we are primarily 
interested in; second, the data are produced by a coding system that 
is not mutually exclusive and exhaustive; third, the coding system 
has changed over time; and fourth, there are errors in the coding. I 
take up these problems in turn. 
1. What’s In The Denominator? 
The AO has consistently used the same criteria to measure the 
trial rate over the years it has been producing the C-4 tables: the 
number of cases that had reached the trial stage when they were 
terminated divided by the total number of cases terminated in a 
given year. This, as Galanter notes, is theoretically an 
overstatement of the trial rate because it includes cases that settle 
after trial has begun.28 That overstatement, of course, makes the 
observation of the vanishing trial a conservative one: things, 
according to this number, are even worse than they appear if we 
are interested in the percentage of cases that are litigated to a 
decision by bench or jury. As such, we see an overstatement of the 
numerator in the reported trial rate. 
The real difficulty in interpreting the trial rate reported in the 
AO’s tables, however, comes from the denominator. It sounds 
appropriate enough: all terminated cases. However, a case is 
                                                          
28 See Galanter, supra note 25, at 461 n.4. 
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“terminated” in the federal court data system whenever it leaves 
the district in which it was filed, however it leaves that district. 
Thus terminations include cases that are transferred to other 
districts or remanded to a state court or an agency. It includes cases 
that are withdrawn without prejudice and ready to be filed 
elsewhere if the plaintiff so chooses. It also includes cases that go 
on hiatus: stayed pending a bankruptcy proceeding or closed 
“statistically” due to inactivity, ready to be re-activated if need be. 
Thus, the denominator includes non-final results. This is important 
for two reasons. First, when interpreting the trial rate as the 
likelihood a case proceeds to trial rather than being settled or 
adjudicated (such as by summary judgment) without a trial, we are 
assuming the rate is the percentage of cases proceeding trial as a 
fraction of all final case outcomes. Although court administrators, 
at the district level, are very interested in what percentage of all the 
cases coming through their doors make it to trial, because that tells 
them how to interpret their filing data in terms of courtroom 
workload, analysts of the legal system are not generally interested 
in what percentage of all cases filed in a particular district went to 
trial; they want to know how frequently a decision was made by 
trial rather than agreement or dispositive motion. 
The second reason that the fact that the denominator of the C-4 
trial rate29 includes non-final dispositions is important is that it is 
entirely possible for this trial rate to drop without any change at all 
in the likelihood that a case goes to trial. This can happen if the 
number of non-final terminations in a district increases, from an 
increase in transfers or remands, for example, or from an increase 
in the withdrawal of cases without prejudice. 
There is another aspect of the denominator of the statistic 
reported in the C-4 tables that is misleading for analysts who want 
to interpret this statistic as the likelihood that a case goes to trial as 
opposed to being settled or adjudicated without a trial by motion. 
This is not a problem of how the statistic is defined, but of the way 
                                                          
29 I want to emphasize that the AO does not call this a “trial rate.” They, 
quite accurately, refer to it in the C-4 tables as “percent reaching trial.” The 
interpretation of this statistic as a trial is something that researchers impose on 
it. 
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in which the statistic reflects a population of cases that does not 
match the case analysts generally have in mind. The federal 
statistic includes all cases filed (and hence terminated) in federal 
court. This includes a very large number of cases that are dealt 
with in largely administrative fashion, often uncontested or only 
minimally contested. These cases include prisoner petitions, which 
often raise habeas corpus and civil rights claims or challenges to 
prison conditions, and actions by the federal government to collect 
on unpaid student loans. These two categories of cases are a large 
fraction of all federal cases and a fraction that grew substantially 
over the last three decades: together, prisoner petitions and student 
loan recovery actions accounted for 20% of all federal cases in 
1970; that number had grown to 30% by 2000.30 This fact is 
important for two related reasons. 
First, prisoner petitions are overwhelmingly treated in an 
administrative fashion: they are generally filed pro se and in forma 
pauperis, and just as generally dismissed summarily, either 
because the petition to file in forma pauperis is denied or because 
the allegations are facially without merit. Student loan recovery 
actions are also routinely dealt with in administrative fashion, not 
because they are without merit but because they are largely 
uncontested and default judgments are entered. Neither of these 
types of litigation are representative of the type of “ordinary” civil 
litigation that analysts have in mind when they interpret the AO’s 
reported trial rates. Both of these classes of cases are essentially 
uncontested and do not tell us about the attributes of the ordinary 
litigation that motivates the trial rate inquiry; they don’t tell us 
whether plaintiffs are facing financial barriers to full trials, or 
whether efforts at alternative dispute resolution are succeeding or 
whether early summary judgment motions are weeding out more 
cases. Of course, this will also be true of numerous cases in other 
case categories. But the sheer size of these two categories has the 
potential to skew our interpretation of the data. 
                                                          
30 See Gillian K. Hadfield, Exploring Economic and Democratic Theories 
of Civil Litigation: Differences Between Individual and Organizational Litigants 
in the Disposition of Federal Civil Cases, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1275, 1286-90 
(2005). 
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The second reason the presence of these large essentially 
uncontested case categories is important is that we could be 
observing a fall in the reported trial rate simply by virtue of the 
growth of the size of this category of non-trial cases. The fact that 
this category grew by 50% over the past three decades suggests 
that caution should be taken when reading into the C-4 trial rate 
evidence any change in the way ordinary litigation is progressing 
through the courts over time. 
2. Are the Categories of Cases Exhaustive and Mutually 
Exclusive? 
A second reason why the data reported by the AO are difficult 
to interpret is because the coding system used by the AO—which 
is designed to accommodate the needs of the management of the 
federal courts and not researchers—is not exhaustive with respect 
to all the categories of interest to researchers and not mutually 
exclusive. 
First, the AO has two variables that can be used to identify 
“trials”: 1) a “procedural progress” variable that indicates the stage 
a case had reached at the time it was terminated, and 2) a 
“Disposition” variable that indicates the manner of disposition. 
The AO’s C-4 tables are based on the procedural progress variable 
and indicate (as is of interest for those who have to manage the 
availability of courtrooms and judges) the percentage of cases that 
reach the trial stage. If researchers are interested in the question of 
whether a case is resolved by adjudication at trial, rather than by 
settlement or pre-trial motion, however, we need to look not at the 
procedural progress variable but at the disposition variable. 
The disposition variable currently includes 20 codes, though 
the number has changed over time. Excluding the codes for clearly 
non-final terminations (such as transfers, remands and stays), the 
codes that are relevant to an investigation of the changing 
disposition of cases are: 
 
Disp 2 Dismissed: want of prosecution 
Disp 3 Dismissed: lack of jurisdiction 
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Disp 4 Judgment on default 
Disp 5 Judgment on consent 
Disp 6 Judgment on motion before trial 
Disp 7 Jury verdict  
Disp 8 Directed verdict 
Disp 9 Court trial 
Disp 12 Dismissed: voluntary 
Disp 13 Dismissed: settled 
Disp 14 Dismissed: other  
Disp 17 Judgment on other 
Disp 19 Judgment on appeal affirmed (magistrate judge) 
Disp 20 Judgment on appeal denied (magistrate judge)31  
 
Although this is a lengthy list, it is not an exhaustive list of the 
dispositions we would like to distinguish for purposes of exploring, 
for example, the question of whether increasing settlement rates or 
summary judgment rates account for any drop in trial rates. Notice 
first that the code for “Judgment on motion before trial” does not 
distinguish among the wide variety of motions that could terminate 
a case. A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim (F.R.C.P. 
12(b)(6)), for example, is not distinguished from a motion for 
summary judgment. The code for “Dismissed: other” also does not 
distinguish between a dismissal for failure to state a claim and 
other reasons for dismissal (such as a failure to adhere to required 
filing deadlines). Likewise, “judgment on other” does not 
distinguish among the “other” reasons for a judgment to be 
rendered, such as an order from an appellate court to enter 
judgment and a judgment on the pleadings. Similarly, the code for 
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction does not distinguish between 
dismissals for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, which are 
generally with prejudice, and dismissals for lack of personal 
jurisdiction, which are generally without prejudice.32 
While the lack of exhaustive categories is significant, the 
greater problem facing empirical researchers is the failure of the 
                                                          
31 FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, FEDERAL COURT CASES: INTEGRATED DATA 
BASE, 1970-2000, PART 117: CIVIL TERMINATIONS, 2000, 14-15 (2002). 
32 FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b). 
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coding system to be mutually exclusive. This is, however, a 
problem that only becomes apparent on review of how the coding 
system is used in the courts. To review the coding system, I33 
conducted thousands of audits of several of the codes for the 2000 
data using the internet-accessible PACER system.34 That is, I drew 
samples of cases coded, for example, “judgment on motion before 
trial,” and then looked at the docket sheet for each case in the 
sample to determine whether the case was indeed terminated with 
judgment on a motion before trial. What I found is that particular 
dispositions were coded in multiple ways.35 Settlements, for 
example, were not always coded “Dismissed: settled.” Often they 
were coded as “Dismissed: voluntary.” Sometimes they were even 
coded as “Dismissed: other” or “Judgment on other.” These are not 
obviously wrong codings, from the perspective of the court system 
and the goals of judicial management. But the overlapping use of 
the codes presents an enormous difficulty to researchers seeking to 
identify all the cases that are settled. 
The unfortunate implication of the lack of mutually exclusive 
coding is that to a large extent empirical researchers lose what is so 
valuable about the federal judicial database, namely that it provides 
extensive detail on a case-by-case basis. This is the type of data 
that is required to perform regression analysis, necessary to test 
hypotheses about the potential causes of variation across case-
types, across jurisdictions, among litigant types, and over time in 
the disposition of cases. While the audits provide a method of 
correcting the data,36 they relegate us to descriptive analysis of the 
aggregate patterns in disposition. 
                                                          
33 Together with several research assistants, to whom I am grateful. 
34 I am grateful to the great many judges in the federal district courts who 
granted me a waiver of the fees normally charged for access to PACER. 
35 For a complete description of these results, see Hadfield, supra note 30. 
36 See Gillian Hadfield, Where Have All the Trials Gone?, 1 J. OF 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 705 (2004) (providing a method for correcting the 
data). 
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3. How Much Error Is There In the Coding of Cases? 
A third source of difficulty in the use of the federal trials data 
is the presence of sheer error in the coding of cases. This is more 
problematic than admitting that the coding system is not mutually 
exclusive and that there are multiple “correct” codes possible for a 
settled case, for example. Instead it goes to the basic problem that a 
transferred case, for example, can be mis-coded as disposed of by 
judgment on a motion before trial. A certain amount of coding 
error of this type is expected in any large data set, but the rates of 
error in the federal data are relatively high for some codes.37 
When we combine the true errors in coding with the errors that 
a researcher who interprets the codes to be mutually exclusive will 
make, we find some impossibly high rates of error overall: 
 
Disp 6 Judgment on motion before trial 20% 
Disp 7 Jury verdict 8% 
Disp 9 Court trial 12% 
Disp 12 Dismissed: voluntary 50% 
Disp 13 Dismissed: settled 6% 
Disp 14 Dismissed: other 65% 
Disp 17 Judgment on other  50% 
 
The errors shown above are “type 1” errors, that is, cases in 
which the true disposition is not the coded disposition, as that 
code might be naturally interpreted by a researcher. The error in 
the “Dismissed: other” category, for example, reflects that fact 
that in 2000, a researcher who relied on this disposition code to 
identify dismissals that were neither voluntary, nor settlements, 
nor transfers, nor dismissals for lack of jurisdiction, nor stays—
and thus infers that the remaining cases were adjudicated 
dismissals—will be wrong 65% of the time. Other errors are 
“type 2” errors and are similar to what was described above, in 
                                                          
37 Theodore Eisenberg & Margo Schlanger, The Reliability of the 
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts Database: An Initial Empirical 
Analysis, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1455 (2003) (documenting the codes in the 
federal data used to identify the amounts demanded and awarded). 
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which a disposition associated with one code is mis-coded and 
thus “hidden” in another code. I found significant numbers of 
bench trials, for example, hidden in the codes for “Judgment on 
other” and “Dismissed: other.” This has significant implications 
for the reliability of claims about the disappearing trial. 
4. Are the Codes the Same Over Time? 
A final difficulty in using the federal trial data to assess 
changes in the disposition of federal cases, and specifically to 
answer the question of whether trials are vanishing, is that the 
coding system used by the federal courts has changed over time. 
Again, this is a standard issue facing researchers working with 
time series, and the federal courts are no exception. There are 
always tradeoffs to be made in deciding whether to “fix” a coding 
system (clearly the critique I offer above suggests some possible 
“fixes”) and thereby disrupt the comparability between years. 
Prior to 1979, there were no disposition codes for trial 
outcomes; only a “Judgment for” code indicating “Judgment for 
plaintiff,” “Judgment for defendant,” or “Judgment for both.” This 
is why, for comparability going back to the early 1960s, it is only 
possible to report the percentage of cases going to trial using the 
procedural progress variable. 
The most significant change in the disposition codes in the 
federal data happened in 1986. During that year, the courts 
switched from a coding system with ten codes to one with twenty. 
Obviously, this was a significant beneficial gain in terms of the 
exhaustiveness of categories. But it presents researchers with the 
problem that, even accounting for the errors discussed above, it is 
not possible to go back earlier than 1987 to track what happened, 
for example, to particular types of dismissals. Prior to 1987, there 
were two categories of dismissal: “Dismissed for want of 
prosecution,” and “Dismissed, discontinued, settled, withdrawn, 
etc.” This lack of continuity limits the ability to assess claims 
about longer-term changes in the disposition of federal cases. 
The changes in the coding systems also introduce another 
problem, which is that the change evidently prompts a spike in 
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coding errors, as clerks become accustomed to the new system. In 
1986, the disposition code “3” referred to “Dismissed, 
discontinued, settled, withdrawn, etc.” In 1987, disposition code 
“3” referred to “Dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.” A review of 
the 1987 data appears to indicate that there were a tremendous 
number of dismissals for lack of jurisdiction in 1987—clearly a 
result of large numbers of cases which were dismissed for any 
reason continuing to be coded with a “3.” Over a period of about 5 
years, this number settles down to a more believable and relatively 
low rate. 
B. Making Do With the Data: What We Know 
As most of the scientists who deal with courts would attest, the 
problems of incomplete, unreliable and inadequate data are hardly 
rare. Indeed, much of the skill of analyzing data in a reliable 
scientific manner is the skill of teasing out evidence capable of 
testing hypotheses from problematic data. The problems in the 
federal court data, with which we would like to test hypotheses 
about the changing disposition of cases, severely limit what we can 
say, even descriptively; but we are not left with nothing to say at 
all. And if anything, the inadequacies provide a strong argument 
for the need for more and better data about the legal system. 
After conducting the audits of the disposition codes in the 
federal data, I used these results to estimate the “correct” 
percentage of cases in each code for the year 2000. My samples in 
the audits were generally large enough, for example, to determine 
with some confidence the actual share of settled cases and tried 
cases.38 In addition, in order to examine questions about the role 
that the type of litigant might play in the disposition of cases, I 
coded the case-level data for the type of plaintiff and defendant, 
either “individual” or “organization,” and again I audited the 
coding system against the PACER docket records.39 I then 
                                                          
38 See Hadfield, supra note 30, at 1281-84 (giving full discussion of this 
estimation technique and the others discussed). 
39 These types of questions include: Do individual litigants face higher cost 
obstacles to going to trial? Do businesses prefer to settle cases in order to benefit 
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estimated the correction factors for the disposition codes based on 
samples of cases that were drawn separately from the four 
casetypes that resulted from the litigant coding I used: individual 
versus individual, individual versus organization, organization 
versus individual, and organization versus organization. This 
allowed me to estimate the percentage of cases disposed of by the 
various modes of disposition for each of these four case types. 
Table 1, below, shows the results I obtained when I restricted the 
population of cases to those that were most like the “ordinary” 
civil lawsuit we generally have in mind when assessing the pros 
and cons of the vanishing trial. I removed the prisoner and student 
loan cases from the population given the risk that these would 
distort our picture. I also removed cases that were non-final and 
those that were uncontested through either default or abandonment, 
that is, cases where there was no real possibility that the case could 
have been tried, settled, or disposed on a contested pre-trial 
motion. (In the following table, I refer to any final case disposition 
other than full trial or settlement as “non-trial adjudication.”) 
 
Table 1: Disposition by Casetype, Final Contested Terminations, Federal Civil Cases 2000 
Casetype True 
Disposition 
(percent) I v. I I v. O O v. I O v. O 
Settlement 55.0 53.1 71.6 71.0 
Non-Trial 
Adjudication  34.5 34.5 21.1 22.0 
Bench 
Decision 5.7 7.3 5.7 5.6 
Jury and 
Directed 
Verdict 
4.2 2.6 1.2 1.4 
All Trials 9.9 9.9 6.9 7.0 
 
                                                          
from the confidentiality that can be maintained? Has the overall trial rate 
decreased because of a shift to a greater percentage of cases involving 
organizational litigants? 
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The problems in the data that I have discussed limit my ability 
to perform statistical significance tests on these estimates,40 but 
there is a good basis nonetheless for confidence in the many 
differences shown in Table 1. As we can see, individual and 
organizational plaintiffs see significantly different results in their 
cases. Individual plaintiffs are much less likely to see their cases 
settled than are organizational plaintiffs, in both cases regardless of 
whether the defendant is an individual or an organization. 
Individual plaintiffs are much more likely to see their cases 
adjudicated, with or without a full trial, than are organizational 
plaintiffs, again regardless of whether the defendant is an 
individual or an organization. 
Most importantly, from the perspective of investigating claims 
about the vanishing trial we can see first that the trial rate has not 
shrunk to zero, or even to 1.8%, as we might conclude from the 
original AO C-4 tables.41 In 2000, individual plaintiff cases went to 
trial 10% of the time. Comparatively, organizational plaintiff cases 
went to trial 7% of the time. Overall, given that individual plaintiff 
cases account for approximately 70% of all federal civil cases,42 
even after excluding prisoner and student loan cases, the overall 
trial rate for federal civil cases was on the order of 9% in 2000. 
If we now want to know whether this trial rate—the percentage 
of final, contested non-prisoner, non-student loan cases that were 
resolved with a trial rather than settlement or non-trial 
adjudication—is higher, lower or the same as it was in 1970, 
however, we face a true obstacle. The work that was required to 
more accurately estimate the 2000 trial rate, as laborious as it was, 
is nothing compared to the work that would be required to perform 
the same procedures for the 1970 data. To audit the 1970 data for 
true disposition and casetype, would require hand-culling dockets 
from the files in courthouses across the country, even if we used 
(as we could and should) only a sample of districts to estimate the 
results for the federal system as a whole. 
                                                          
40 See Hadfield, supra note 30, at 1316-18 (discussing the significance of 
the results up to the step prior to the one represented in this table). 
41 See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
42 See Hadfield, supra note 30, at 1298 (giving these estimates). 
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Even without the appropriate data for comparison to 1970, 
however, we can see in Table 1 the reason why we need 
significantly improved data and investigation into the basic 
question of whether the trial rate has changed over time. It is clear 
that today the type of litigants in a case, in particular the type of 
plaintiff, matters significantly for the disposition of the case. 
Moreover, as I discuss more fully in the paper that developed these 
estimates, the normative and prescriptive implications of changing 
case disposition vary depending on the nature of the litigants: a 
drop in public trials may be a concern in cases involving 
individuals but not in cases involving organizations only; efforts to 
increase settlements may have different effects and may need 
different designs depending on the nature of the litigants involved; 
and so on.43 Table 1 also raises the possibility—a hypothesis that 
needs to be tested—that increased efforts to dispose of cases pre-
trial, such as heightened standards for surviving a motion for 
summary judgment, may not reduce costly expenditures on trials—
they may only reduce the incidence of relatively less expensive 
settlement. Additionally, Table 1 also suggests a caution for the 
frequent assumption that reduced trial rates must imply reduced 
public adjudication and hence precedent creation. In reality, it 
appears that much of the difference in settlement rates between 
individual plaintiff and organizational plaintiff cases comes not 
from differences in the rate of trial but rather from differences in 
the rate at which cases are disposed of with non-trial adjudication, 
a process that can and does produce precedent. At a minimum, 
Table 1 tells us that the phenomena occurring in the federal courts 
are complex and in need of much more refined empirical 
investigation before we can reach appropriate conclusions about 
whether and how judges and courts should change what they do. 
CONCLUSION 
The investigation of the data underlying the vanishing trial 
contains a sobering message for the important questions judges, 
                                                          
43 See id. 
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lawyers, and policy makers have about the relationship between 
science and law. Even with respect to the much less refined, purely 
descriptive, question of whether cases are more or less likely to go 
to trial today than they were in 1970, our knowledge is painfully 
slim. This is especially true once we subject our claims to the same 
types of rigorous standards we require of the scientists and science-
based decisions the legal system regulates. Answering the hard 
questions of whether Daubert hearings are weeding out too many 
or too few cases, whether the cost of science-based litigation is 
hobbling scientific investigation, whether corporations are 
resorting to secret settlements to such an extent as to reduce the 
deterrence effect of law, and so on, require us to press far beyond 
the limits of what we reliably can say—on the basis of data and 
proper inference, not anecdote and personal experience—about 
what is happening in our courtrooms and law offices. 
Indeed, the work on the vanishing trial question that I have 
conducted cautions in particular against the risks we face of 
misunderstanding the legal system if we look only to personal 
experience. Table 1 showed that what is happening to the trial in 
federal courtrooms—how many cases are settling, how many are 
being disposed of with non-trial adjudication, how many are 
ultimately going to trial—depends significantly on the type of 
litigants involved, whether individual or organizational. We know 
from other empirical work, specifically the careful studies of 
Chicago lawyers reported in the 1982 book Chicago Lawyers and 
the recent Urban Lawyers, that the lawyers who represent 
organizations are not generally the same lawyers who represent 
individuals.44 Moreover, the lawyers who represent organizations 
tend to have greater prestige and influence in the legal profession. 
We need to be careful, then, to remember that particular lawyers—
participating in ABA committees, for example, or contributing to 
conferences discussing the state of the legal system—will have 
personal experiences (of never getting to trial, settling more often 
or facing greater difficulty surviving summary judgment, for 
example) that are reflective of the particular type of clients they 
                                                          
44 See HEINZ, supra note 24; JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD O. LAUMANN, 
CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR (1982). 
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represent. The data we do have should warn us against the 
reliability of a generalization from personal experience that does 
not take into account the differences among clients, and among 
lawyers. Similar differences could be found, I suspect, if we 
looked to the mix of casetypes that show up in courtrooms in 
different parts of the country. This would suggest a caution to 
judges about generalizing from personal experience and should 
spur the call for more and better data on which we can reliably 
base our understanding of how our legal system operates. 
The importance of the issues of how law regulates science, 
then, demands that law become more scientific itself. This requires 
that those in the legal system, including lawyers, judges, legal 
scholars and policymakers, understand the need for vastly 
increased efforts to collect data about the legal system. 
Institutionally, the legal system needs to develop a “public health” 
attitude towards itself, and find ways, as the medical community 
has, to protect confidentiality for clients without treating 
everything that happens in the legal system as a strictly private 
matter. Just as the information doctors gain from documenting 
what happens to a patient who comes into a hospital for treatment 
is ultimately essential for the progress of medicine, so too is the 
information gained by lawyers, judges and courts from evaluating, 
litigating, settling and adjudicating cases essential for the progress 
of law. 
 
